Living in a Material World

Michael Denton, author of Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, has been an outspoken critic of certain aspects of traditional evolutionary theory and has contributed much to the current debate over evolution. I praise Denton’s openness and willingness, as he puts it, to “[speak] out against the theology of Darwinism,” and look forward to his continued contribution to the debate.

When asked in an interview about creation, however, Denton quickly retreated to a materialistic definition of science that essentially eliminates the possibility of viewing creation as a scientifically-valid explanation for the origin and diversity of life on the Earth. To be sure, Denton tries to explain his approach by appealing to logical and objective reasoning, but upon closer examination, his explanation does not hold. At the end of the day, Denton, like many others, simply excludes the possibility of “specific creation” on a priori philosophical grounds, rather than any logical or scientific merit. While it is not clear from the interview what Denton means by “specific creation,” what is clear is that he views explanations regarding intervention of deity in the natural world as anathema to science.

For example, Denton states:

“[The direct intervention of God in the course of events] would necessitate . . . overthrowing the goal of science, which is to demonstrate a natural explanation and find natural laws responsible for phenomena in the world around us.”

Additionally:

“Creation implies the breaking of a law. And it’s completely foreign to the idea of science that natural laws are ever intervened to or ever fiddled with by God or anything else. . . . [Science] is not involved in unique or special events of that sort. . . . They are outside the realm of science. . . . It would run counter to the whole spirit of science, which is naturalistic . . .”

He then explains his position by arguing that:

“Creationism implies that [natural law] is broken by God at his will. . . . There is something intellectually unsatisfactory, even from a theological position, that God has to intervene in the history of the world to change His laws to bring forth life. After all, the laws that hold universally throughout the cosmos – why did the same Law-Giver break the laws to get life? . . . Surely God doesn’t have to break His laws to create life.”

Denton may be a good scientist, but his theological position might need some further work. Specifically, it is not at all clear why he thinks there is something “intellectually unsatisfactory” from a theological position that God intervened in the history of the world to create life. Indeed, that intervention is one of the basic premises of most major theological positions.

More importantly, Denton equivocates when he suggests that creation implies the breaking of natural law. Indeed, insofar as all experience teaches us, creative acts embody the very understanding and utilization of natural law to bring forth a desired end. This is precisely the capability that one expects of a great human inventor or creator, and the capability that one might expect God to possess in abundance.

Let’s look at a simple example: let’s suppose that someone living 1,000 years ago saw a Boeing 747 fly overhead. He might reasonably think that such a thing was fantastic, unbelievable, a miracle, and even a violation of the natural law of gravity that he understood and felt every day. (Incidentally, this is more than a hypothetical: even in our era the Wright brothers encountered some of the same resistance when they announced that they had succeeded at heavier-than-air flight.) But would the creator of the 747 have “broken” the law of gravity? Certainly not. Rather the creator would have understood and utilized other natural laws, such as those governing propulsion and aerodynamics, to temporarily counterbalance the effects of the law of gravity. Furthermore, gravity would still be very operational and just as necessary to the equation as propulsion and aerodynamics; otherwise, the 747 would shoot away from the Earth to forever drift aimlessly in space. It is not the violation of laws, but the understanding of laws, the balancing of laws, that allows the 747 to function.

The foregoing example is actually much too detailed. Virtually every creation we see around us exists precisely because it works within the parameters of natural law, not because it violates them. If I build a computer, am I violating natural law? If I paint a painting or create a beautiful sculpture, have I violated natural law? Certainly not. In every creative endeavor of which we are aware, the creator works not by violating natural laws, but by thoroughly understanding them and utilizing them toward an end.

Thus, Denton’s rejection of creation as an explanation for life on the grounds of creation’s unsatisfactory theological position is but the rejection of a straw man. After all, Denton’s assumption that God established the natural laws in the first place is itself a theological proposition. And the concept of creation certainly does not imply that the act of creation violates those laws. If pushed, I suspect Denton would admit that natural laws need not be broken as a result of God’s creative intervention. It’s just that Denton doesn’t want God to intervene.

Along these lines Denton finally states in his interview that “I can’t accept a creationist explanation for evolution, except as a last resort. I will push naturalism to the limit, and I don’t think that limit’s been reached . . .” In effect, he acknowledges the real reason for his position, which is that he wants to push the naturalistic explanation as far as it can go without invoking an intervening Creator.

With respect to this approach to scientific inquiry, I must say that I actually find Denton’s statement quite reasonable. Indeed, I think it may even be an appropriate approach for scientific inquiry in general. However, if this approach is taken, it is exceedingly important to be genuinely willing to recognize when that “limit” of naturalism has been reached.

William Dembski and others such as Michael Behe argue that the limit has already been reached, at least in some instances, in naturalism’s utter failure to explain either the origin of life or its complexity and diversity. In contrast, Denton says that the limit of naturalism has not been reached, and until that time, he won’t seek a non-naturalistic explanation. After all, while evolutionary theory has little answer to the origin and diversity of life, surely someone someday will arrive at a naturalistic explanation for it all. Thus, we needn’t consider alternative explanations, at least for the foreseeable future.

Perhaps this is just a difference of degree: some scientists think the limit has been reached; Denton thinks it hasn’t. However, from listening to Denton I suspect that his “limit” is so far distant, that it is in no danger of being reached any time soon. This is another example of the “promissory note” of evolutionary theory, to borrow an analogy from Behe. It is a note with no maturity date, and no clear statement of value. Some are becoming increasingly skeptical about whether the promissory note will ever be turned into more than just that: a promise. There needs to be real room in scientific inquiry for the non-naturalistic explanation, not just lip service about some distant future time and place when it might be appropriate.

Michael Denton has made and continues to make a valuable contribution to the current debate regarding evolution, and I hope he will continue to do so. His willingness to stand up and be counted as a critic of traditional Darwinism is both significant and refreshing. One may hope his continuing scrutiny of evolutionary theory will also lead to increased scrutiny of the philosophical underpinnings of the approach to the theory itself.

Eric Anderson

October 6, 2003